I. Introductory Remarks
"… behavioral economics [in the wider sense] will contribute to the foundation of the new paternalistic state. […] … by becoming behavioral, economics is no longer capable of providing an intellectual safeguard against excess government intrusion in private matter" (Saint-Paul 2011, pp. 4 and 97) .
Paternalism has been known for long as a specific type of practicing policy generally criticized by liberal economists of lacking sound scientific justifications (Saint-Paul 2011) . 2 In recent years, however, this assessment seems no longer valid since paternalism visibly gains ground: Different variations of paternalism have become a recommended concept in the theory of economic policy driven by and intrinsically related to recent advances in economic theory. The economic psychologist and winner of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics, Daniel Kahneman (2011) , for example, argues for soft paternalism; the behavioral economist Richard H. Thaler and his co-author Cass R. Sunstein, once an influential economic advisor to the Obama administration, speak of libertarian paternalism; and the British economist Richard Layard derives a specific type of hard paternalism from happiness economics. 3 The reason for choosing these 'new economics' approaches is that they represent three different kinds of economic sub-disciplines -namely, economic psychology, behavioral economics and happiness economics -which have been gaining momentum in recent years. All three sub-disciplines are in some major respects deviating from mainstream economic theory aiming at establishing a new economic paradigm for the theory of economic policy with far-reaching consequences.
This article aims at making explicit the inherent risks of paternalistic economic policies associated with these newly established economic sub-disciplines. While the authors in general welcome these new strands of research for enriching and critically evaluating standard economics -especially their criticism of the Homo oeconomicus 'heuristics' is of great value contributing to a more realistic idea of man -, the recommended lessons for economic policy should be received with caution and thus be subjected to a critical constitutional politico-economic review.
The article also shows that the new economic sub-disciplines are not necessarily accompanied by a paternalistic style of politics; traditional, constitutional-political recommendations can also be derived from the (new) 'normative economics': The happiness economics approach by Frey et al., for example, not only avoids the inherent risks of a paternalistic state, it also stands (more) in the Kantian and constitutional economics traditions taking the autonomy and (citizen) sovereignty of people, human dignity and the protection of (inalienable) human rights seriously. It thus seems to be better suited for a modern version of Ordnungspolitik.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: In the first step (sections 2 and 3), we recapitulate Kahneman's, Thaler/Sunstein's and Layard's versions of paternalism, pointing at similarities and differences alike. We then contrast libertarian or soft paternalism of behavioral economics (Thaler and Sunstein) and economic psychology (Kahneman) with Layard's happiness economics and its apparent hard paternalism. In the second step (sections 4 and 5), we analyze the politico-economic implications of soft and hard paternalism. We give an overview of the main points of criticism of paternalism from a constitutional economics perspective. The idea of man argument is discussed as well as the Ordnungspolitik, politico-economic, epistemological and slippery slope arguments. In the third step (section 6), we show that an alternative approachalso stemming from the new economic sub-disciplines -is possible, one that stands (more) in the tradition of constitutional economics and (classical) Ordnungspolitik. The article ends with some concluding remarks in section 7.
II. Soft or Libertarian Paternalism

The 'Nudge' Approach
As to the different versions of paternalism under discussion, we can draw a distinction between libertarian or soft paternalism of behavioral economics and economic psychology, on the one hand (Thaler, Sunstein and Kahneman) , and hard paternalism of (a particular form of) happiness economics (Layard) , on the other hand. 4 First, let's have a closer look at Thaler and Sunstein's concept of libertarian paternalism (Thaler and Sunstein 2003a , 2003b Sunstein 2013a Sunstein , 2013b Carlin et al. 2009 ): The overall aim of this approach is to (re-)organize the context in which individual decisions are made. All that counts is the choice architecture Sunstein 2008/2009, chapter 5) and some situations require a push or a nudge in the 'right' direction.
The reason why Sunstein (2008/2009, pp. 4 ff.) speak of libertarian paternalism is that their approach tries to combine liberal as well as paternalistic elements 5 : The 'libertarian' elements refer to the aim of conserving and ideally increasing individual freedom and autonomy of choice by adequate policy guidelines. People should be free to do what they really want and to opt-out of undesirable options in case that they want to do so. The paternalistic elements, on the contrary, refer to choice architects in influencing and steering people's decisions (and behavior) into the 'right' direction. According to Thaler and Sunstein, 4 Cp. for the distinction between soft and hard paternalism : Feinberg 1986 , pp. 12 ff.; see also Dworkin 1972 , p. 29 and Shiffrin 2000 for a general definition of paternalism.
5
See Garren (2006 Garren ( , 2007 for the (alleged) incompatibility of liberalism and paternalism; see also Grüne-Yanoff 2012, p. 636. thoughtful and 'caring' one, an approach that does not restrict the available options or rule out any possibilities. It aims at not imposing sanctions or prohibitions.
Soft paternalism has its most significant effects in the fields of investments, pension plans, organ donation and healthcare: Typical objectives of paternalistic interventions by nudges are to enlarge life expectancy, increase personal well-being or improve health conditions Sunstein 2008/2009, chapters 6-12) . The overall aim is to create a user-friendly framing and to re-design the architecture or setting in which choices are to be made. The basic principles for a good choice architecture include (consumeradequate) standard defaults, fault tolerance, feedback mechanism, mapping and transparency Sunstein 2008/2009, pp. 83 ff.) .
Foundations in Economic Psychology and Behavioral Economics
The parallels to and from Kahneman's work are astonishing. Both research agendas seem to complement each other: Kahneman, for example, speaks of soft paternalism, while Thaler and Sunstein argue for libertarian paternalism. Moreover, Kahneman refers to Thaler's distinction between 'Econs' and 'Humans' Sunstein 2008/2009, pp. 6 ff.; Kahneman 2011, pp. 269, 277 and 411 ff.) , while Thaler and Sunstein in turn build on Kahneman's and Tversky's work on cognitive fallacies, heuristics and biases (Kahneman and Tversky 1972 , 1974 , 1979 , 1984 , 1986 , 1996 Tversky and Kahneman 1971 , 1980 , 1983 , 1992 ). Kahneman's (and Tversky's) work is well-known for its distinction between two types of reasoning -an intuitive-automatic one (System 1) and a reflective, rational and deliberative one (System 2). The automatic-intuitive system works uncontrolled, effortless, fast, unconscious and in an associative way. The reflective system instead works controlled, effortful, self-conscious, rule-governed and in a deductive way. In short, gut feelings and instincts face rational thinking (Kahneman 2011, pp. 20 ff. (part I); Haidt 2001, p. 818) .
Rules of thumb or heuristics are essential in dealing with everyday complexity. They help to reduce complexity in an overly complex world. Yet at the same time they are often the main cause for systematic cognitive errors. The most often-discussed judgment heuristics are the anchor, availability and representativeness heuristics (Kahneman 2011, part II) .
Other sources of systematic errors and cognitive biases include unrealistic optimism -accompanied by cognitive dissonance (Akerlof and Dickens 1982) -and overconfidence -often leading towards excessive risk-taking. The above-average effect is a good example illustrating overconfidence in practice. Loss aversion is a further phenomenon discussed by Kahneman and Sunstein (2008/2009, pp. 17 ff.) . It incorporates inertia, myopia and procrastination as well as the preservation and protection of vested rights. Cognitive idleness as well as a lack of will-power also play a major role in the status quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988) : Most people tend to preserve the current situation; they hold on and stick to the status quo. Last but not least, framing effects (Kahneman 2011, p. 272 ) also reflect the 'bounded rationality' (Simon 1955 (Simon , 1959 (Simon , 1990 (Simon , 1991 of humans: the outcome often depends on the way the question is asked, the information is conveyed or the available options are presented. All previously mentioned effects analyzed by Kahneman and Tversky point to the human fallibility caused by the cognitive limitations of humans, that is, the limited abilities to acquire and process information, and the complexity of today's world.
Another reason why individual decisions contain many systematic errors and cognitive illusions is their particular social context: Individual's decisions are heavily shaped by the actions and decisions of others. Pluralistic ignorance and the tendency towards conformism might lead to collective conservatism and preservation of old habits, traditions and shared mental models. The felt social or peer pressure often leads to assimilation to social norms and the feeling to necessarily meet required social standards. The power of social influence might lead to an imitation and mimicking of other's behavior ending into a collectively self-injurious herd behavior. Keynes (1936 Keynes ( /1973 , Shiller (2009/2010 ) speak of 'animal spirits' that seem to dominate human behavior.
Based on the results of their empirical studies, Thaler and Sunstein -in complete accordance with Kahneman -are highly critical of the mainstream economics view of man, the Homo oeconomicus 'model', or as Sunstein (2008/2009 , part I) put it: Econs. Unlike Econs, Humans make lots of systematic mistakes due to their cognitive fallacies and their reliance on heuristics, but also due to the fact that they are highly influenced by the social setting and interactions. Human reasoning is shaped (to a large degree) by inertia and dullness, cognitive biases and errors -due to cognitive limitations and constraints. Consequently, the 'Human world' is fundamentally different from the 'Econ World', a world full of Homines oeconomici.
Econs of standard economic theory are unboundedly or hyper-rational, unemotional and self-interested utility maximizers with stable and consistent preferences and 'informed (and rational) desires' (Qisilbash 2012). Humans, on the contrary, are de facto boundedly rational actors. Unlike Econs who solely rely on System 2, Humans possess both Systems 1 and 2 (Kahneman 2011, p. 277) . Their decision-making capabilities are cognitively limited due to the omnipresence and dominance of System 1 and the laziness of System 2. Thus, they are not as rationally consistent and logical as Econs. Moreover, they are not narrowly selfish and egoistic; instead, altruistic preferences and pro-social behavior play a huge role, and their decisions are shaped by social context, culture and history as well as emotions, affects and intuitions.
Consequences for Economic Policy
Thaler and Sunstein argue that in a nation full of Econs, politics should refrain from intervening into markets. It should rather keep out of the way allowing Econs to act as they want to as long as they do no harm. However, in a world full of Humans, politics has a prominent role to fulfill, a role that exceeds the function of the state as libertarian or laissez-faire night watchman state. Here, politics is required to nudge people to make the 'right' decisions that serve their own long-term interests. Contrary to Econs, Humans need protection by the state; otherwise their foibles would be exploited by others and harm would arise. In soft or libertarian paternalism, the state assists people to overcome their systematic cognitive biases and helps to prevent the adverse effects of boundedly rational behavior. In this regard, nudges are (ideally) able to pave the way towards achieving public goods: they channel behavior into socially desirable directions and help to promote the common good, e.g., in the form of an increase of the savings rate, a better healthcare, an increase in the number of organ donations or environmental protection.
For many observers -including politicians, state officials and bureaucrats -soft or libertarian paternalism seems attractive and appealing (at least at first sight); it is often preferred to hard paternalism with its commands, orders, bans and prohibitions (yet this soft(er) version of paternalism is not without (any) problems as the following sections will show); it tries to avoid authoritarian coercion and compulsion, and aims to make use of economic incentive structures, wherever possible -, e.g., in the form of impersonal or personalized default rules (Sunstein 2013c) . Given the complexity of everydaylife and human bounded rationality, people are looking out for help to reduce complexity and cognitive limitations to a minimum; they are sensitive and susceptible to nudges. With the help of adequate standard settings and default rules provided by public authorities, it becomes (ideally) feasible for ordinary people to deal with these complexities.
Thaler's and Sunstein's approach assumes that nudges are preferably applied in a sparing, efficient and purposeful way. The golden rule of soft or libertarian paternalism is: the state and other eligible public institutions should apply those kinds of nudges that most likely help people making better decisions, and at the same time, avoid those nudges that potentially harm others. That is, soft or libertarian paternalism assumes that people need small, little nudges when they face difficult, complex and unique situations, when they do not receive proper and immediate feedback information and when they do not grasp all relevant aspects of the decision-making process. Here, the state can help providing information relevant for decision-making and improving feedback mechanisms.
Thaler and Sunstein state that competitive markets and their incentive structures are an indispensable tool Sunstein 2008/2009, pp. 97 ff.) : Well-functioning markets can compensate and relativize the cognitive foibles of human beings; and competition can protect irrational customers and improve their decision-making. In some cases, however, competitive markets need to be complemented by soft state interventionism, e.g., in the form of nudges -and it is this argument that goes beyond the classical cases of market failures: From the perspective of behavioral economics (and economic psychology), market failures are broadly defined not only taking externalities, asymmetric information, market power and public goods into account, but also incorporating cognitive errors and biases as a further category of market failure.
6 The behavior-
6
In his recent articles, Sunstein speaks of 'behavioral market failure' (i.e., behavioral and cognitive anomalies) as a supplement to the standard account of market failure, providing new legitimizing grounds for government action (Sunstein 2013b, pp. 72 ff.) . These kinds of market failure apparently justify 'means paternalism' (as opposed to 'end paternalism') (Sunstein 2013a (Sunstein , pp. 1834 (Sunstein ff. and 1842 2013b, pp. 192 ff.) , which is equivalent to the 'regulatory moneyball' of the nudge approach and libertarian paternalism.
al economics concept of market failure thus goes beyond the traditional (neo-classical) theory opening up the door for a new form of (corrective) state interventionism. Before turning to a fundamental critique of paternalistic policies, let us first take a closer look at Layard's research program that explicitly and positively refers to the libertarian paternalism concept of Thaler and Sunstein (and Kahneman) (Layard 2005 (Layard /2011 . Here, the paternalistic tendencies are even more pronounced than in Thaler/Sunstein's and Kahneman's approaches and the inherent risks manifest themselves and become more visible.
III. Hard Paternalism
The 'Greatest Happiness Principle'
Layard's happiness economics stands in the tradition of Benthamite utilitarian philosophy. In its center is the 'Greatest Happiness Principle' according to which "[t]he common good consists in the happiness of all" (Layard 2010, pp. 27; 2005 . The best society, according to Layard, is the one where citizens are the happiest, the best private behavior is that which produces the most happiness for the people it affects, and the best public policy is the one which produces the greatest happiness of all. Public policy thus should be committed to promote happiness as the ultimate common good in society; politics must be judged by how it fosters human happiness respectively reduces human misery and unhappiness (Layard 2005 (Layard /2011 2010, pp. 26 ff.) .
Foundations in Happiness Economics
Happiness economics has shown that, although living standards have risen so sharply in most industrialized countries, the level of happiness has not increased in the last few decades. This result is often referred to as the Easterlin Paradox (Easterlin 1974 (Easterlin , 1995 7 , named after one of the 'fathers' of happiness economics, Richard Easterlin.
The reasons for this -at first sight -paradoxical result include the subsequent ones (cp. for the following: Layard 2005/2011, pp. 29 ff. and 41 ff.): First, the actual level of happiness that an individual perceives is not only related to its absolute income. What counts even more are the relative income as well as the perceived relative position in society. Second, the income aspirations and expectations are essential: the level of happiness depends much more on what other individuals get and what a person is used to get -pointing towards the importance of social comparisons and habituation. In case that the actual income rises, the expectations and aspirations are rising likewise; the norm by which income is judged rises as much as the pay rises. In recent decades, people's norms have adjusted rapidly to the actual living standards. Third, a pay rise is in some cases related to an upward change in reference group, which might cause misery as well. Interestingly, humans tend to compare themselves to people that are up in the 7 Cp. for a critical review of the Easterlin Paradox: Wolfers 2008, 2013. social hierarchy, not to people that rank lower. This, too, affects the perceived happiness of people. A fourth reason for the lack of improvement in the level of individual happiness in most industrialized countries is the 'hedonic treadmill' problem. According to Layard (2005 Layard ( /2011 , distorted incentives and negative externalities are ubiquitous in our societies: people have to keep running just in order to preserve their perceived level of happiness. There are several incentives in a market society to work more than is socially efficient. The problem is that this self-defeating status race tends to be a zero-sum game: the gain of one person is the loss of another. Layard blames ('Western') societies for this arms race causing a distorted work-life balance (Layard 2005 (Layard /2011 .
Moreover, he criticizes the prevalent consumerism and increasing materialism in industrialized societies. He speaks of an over-investment in material goods at the expense of leisure time. According to him, living standards are to some extent like drugs: people get easily addicted to income and material possessions, that is, they adapt quickly to the material status quo, get used to it, and after a while, they are dissatisfied and demand more (Layard 2005 (Layard /2011 2010, pp. 29) . From Layard's perspective, all previously mentioned negative externalities and distorted incentives need to be corrected by the (paternalistic) state. We will return to this argumentative legitimization of further state interventionism later on in this section.
Before that, we have to explore the determinants of human happiness: Following Layard (2005 Layard ( /2011 , human happiness rests on seven factors, often referred to as 'The Big Seven', that is, family relationships, financial situation, working conditions, community and friends, health, personal freedom, and values. Satisfaction with personal and community life, financial satisfaction, satisfaction with work, good health and political freedom -all these factors contribute to a happy life.
When taking a closer look at the sources of happiness, it becomes obvious that some of these have improved tremendously in the last few decades, especially the overall health (and living) conditions, the level of income and the quality of work. But some of the stated factors have deteriorated (Layard 2005 (Layard /2011 : Here, the alleged worsening of family and community relationships as well as the rising of selfishness and egotism have to be mentioned. These adverse trends manifest themselves in an ever-increasing number of broken families (i.e., divorces and families headed by a single parent), substantially more pressure at work, less cohesive communities, increasing trends in depression, alcoholism and crime as well as a far-reaching decline in social capital (Putnam 1993a (Putnam , 1993b (Putnam , 2000 Coleman 1988 Coleman , 1990 .
Following Layard, all these adverse trends imply a profound alteration in attitudes to the self and society, a fundamental change for the worse since morals and the level of trust are constantly declining. Layard blames the growing culture of rampant individualism, the upward trend in egoism and selfishness and the rise of reckless materialism for the decline of community life and the lack of fellow-feeling, solidarity and social responsibility. His social criticism and structural conservatism become obvious when he states that the spread of television, the increasing geographical mobility in a globalized world economy and the change in gender roles are accountable for the shifting values and when he bemoans the decline in religious belief. According to him, the old religious and socio-cultural norms (and sanctions) are gone leaving decadence, nihilism and a wide-spread moral vacuum (Layard 2005 (Layard /2011 .
Consequences for Economic Policy
Before moving on to a general criticism of soft and hard paternalism, we need to come back to the issue of the (self-destructive) race for status, which seems to be prevalent in modern-day societies, as well as Layard's subsequent politico-economic recommendations (Layard 2005 (Layard /2011 2010, pp. 30 f.) . Here, the inherent risks of the paternalistic state become very clear.
According to Layard, a natural desire for status exists. But since the total amount of status in a society is fixed, this situation might be characterized as a zero-sum game (i.e., one person succeeds while others fail); it brings lots of negative externalities especially for those individuals that do not succeed. This race for status is self-defeating at the level of society since the struggle for relative income and position yields no social net gain. Even worse, it imposes external dis-benefits on others -having a negative effect on the happiness of those it puts pressure on -and involves distorted incentives: people work overtime to compete and keep up with the hedonic treadmill process. Private life and time with family and friends are massively sacrificed. As a result, the work-life balance is distorted causing mental diseases such as burnout, depressions and anxiety states; and the level of trust and social capital decreases within society since the time for community activities shrinks to a minimum (Layard 2005 (Layard /2011 . Layard (2005 Layard ( /2011 f.) speaks of 'physical pollution' that has to be discouraged and here is where the state comes into the play. As Pigou (1920 Pigou ( /1962 has shown, taxes can provide a (standard) cure for pollution of all kinds. The state simply needs to charge people for the damage which they do to others and force them to reduce it. By introducing 'sin taxes' all external costs will be (ideally) taken into account. As a consequence, the polluting activity will be cut back to the socially most efficient level. Therefore, Layard suggests that taxes should be implemented with regard to the hedonic treadmill problem. Taxes on income from socially inefficient work will reduce that kind of work. The tax functions as a corrective: it discourages behavior that is socially undesirable because it leads to a distorted work-life balance. Since taxes have a distorting effect on the struggle for status, they (ideally) help to preserve the work-life balance and overcome the hedonic treadmill issue. It is like taxing addiction: people get used to higher wages and living standards; this leads to adaption and addiction. Because of the distorting effect of unforeseen habituation, the state has to tax unhealthy, addictive expenditures. Taxation therefore rectifies two forms of distortions, the one from pollution or negative externalities and the other one from unforeseen addiction (Layard 2005 (Layard /2011 .
A further field of state interventionism is the one related to the constant growth of performance-related pay (Layard 2005 (Layard /2011 : More and more people get paid based on their individual (monthly or yearly) performance, which displays another reason for the increase in the level of stress and the distorted work-life balance of contemporary societies. One way to tackle this issue is to (massively) reduce performance-related payments. This also includes a state-run reform and restriction of bonus payment (incentive) systems.
Additionally, Layard wants to address the problem of advertisement (Layard 2005 (Layard /2011 . According to the British economist, the sole purpose of ads is to change our value system and to make people want more. It has negative side effects on the level of happiness of those it puts pressure on, a pressure to succeed. In general, advertising lures people into an arms race ending up in a society obsessed by status. Its most serious effect is on children. Consequently, the state should ban all commercial advertising directed at children under the age of 12 and cut tax allowances for pictorial advertising to adults by business corporations.
Furthermore, Layard suggests the following measures which should be adopted by the state to increase individual as well as social well-being: first, high-quality child care education; second, compulsory parenting classes in school (Layard 2005 (Layard /2011 ff.); third, family-friendly practices at work including more flexible hours, more parental leave, easier access to child care, to name a few (Layard 2005 (Layard /2011 . Moreover, he demands an education system that conveys the 'spirit of the public good' (Layard 2005 (Layard /2011 f.), i.e., an education policy that gives less value to status and more value to empathy, other-regarding preferences and pro-social behavior. The chief aim of this school subject, which should include courses in emotional intelligence as well as moral education, is to change our value system and to produce a more virtuous and happier generation of adults (sic!). In addition, a highturnover community with its high level of anonymity has to be prevented due to its (partially) adverse side effects (e.g., a rise in family break-ups and/or increasing crime rates). Consequently, Layard pleads for a restriction of geographical mobility (Layard 2005 (Layard /2011 .
Finally, the state has to take more efforts to fight mental illnesses (Layard 2005 (Layard /2011 . According to Layard, depression and other psychological disorders cause much more misery than poverty. One way to achieve this is to promote the use of psychiatric drugs (Layard 2005 (Layard /2011 to fight schizophrenia, manicdepression, panic attacks, phobias, obsessions and intense anxiety. The principal neurotransmitters that affect mental well-being are serotonin and dopamine. Once, we are more familiar with the specific neurological mechanisms we can make use of happinessenhancing drugs. It is this argument by Layard which illustrates the (substantial) inherent risks of abuse and manipulation (e.g., think of a 'personality change by pill' (Kosfeld et al. 2005) ) that might be involved in (hard) paternalism concepts.
IV. The Challenges of Paternalistic Economic Policies
As the previous sections have shown, the rise of behavioral economics, economic psychology and happiness economics goes along with an increasing number of recommendations of (soft and hard) paternalistic policies as well as a substantial increase in the number of fields of state regulation and interventionism. The following paragraphs give an overview of the inherent risks with regards to soft or libertarian and hard paternalism from a constitutional economics perspective -relying mainly on Buchanan's contractarian liberalism, Hayek's evolutionary liberalism and Eucken's ordoliberalism (and its 'Kantian program of liberty').
Idea of Man Argument: The Kantian-Ordoliberal Idea of Citizen Sovereignty
Behavioral economists like Thaler and Sunstein, economic psychologists like Kahneman and to a lesser degree also happiness economists like Layard are convinced that paternalistic state interventions are required to overcome behavioral and cognitive biases.
8 That is, paternalistic (governmental) interferences supposedly help people to make 'better' choices, which in the end (might) lead to an overall increase in subjective well-being and social welfare. Since people cannot be completely trusted to make fully responsible choices based on their own subjective preferences -due to their bounded rationality -, political and scientific experts are required to 'properly' frame choices (or even to make choices on behalf of individuals) to prevent people from harming themselves or others. Choice architects à la Sunstein and Thaler thus resemble (sectoral) social planners and social engineers 'designing' (parts of) society and prescribing actions of individuals from top-down rather than bottom-up.
Moreover, the apparent trend of 'new economics' towards an increase of paternalistic policy instruments -often accompanied with a proliferation of new state regulations and an increase in state bureaucracy -goes along with greater government intrusion into the private sphere (this is especially true for Layard's hard paternalism which extends and broadens the state's tasks and responsibilities considerably). It also contains a responsibility transfer from the individual to the state as well as a decline in democratic legitimacy: actions of individuals are paternalistically prescribed, values are heteronomously imposed upon individuals by the (nanny) state 9 and (non-legitimized) experts -e.g., Thaler/Sunstein's choice architects -decide what is best for society, which implies an elitist-expertocratic form of decision-making (Saint-Paul 2011).
The former liberal state thus (might) gradually turn into a nanny state or 'benevolent dictatorship'. In doing so, the state's attitude towards its people changes dramatically: it might now be characterized as tutelage, patronage and infantilizing. The paternalistic state aims at parenting, nurturing and educating its people like a nanny or 'benevolent dictator' (this attitude might, as a side-product, even increase inertia, idleness and procrastination and might undermine proactive decision-making, self-education and selfenlightenment; in the end, it might simply be counter-productive to reach the primary 8 In traditional paternalistic concepts, restrictions and prohibitions have only been justified in the case of children and the mentally ill, that is, people that are characterized by incompetence, incapacity, ignorance, immaturity and a lack of autonomy (Garren 2006 (Garren , 2007 . Now, with the new conceptions of paternalism, the grounds for paternalism are extended to also include competent adults with a (boundedly) rational agency capacity. 9 Paternalism, in general, is motivated and justified by the claim that the individual interfered with will be protected from physical, psychological and economic (self-)harm. It intends to produce good for an individual -i.e., the individual will be 'better off' -, hence the term 'benevolent paternalism' (Goodin 1991; Harsanyi 2007). objectives of behavioral economics (à la Thaler and Sunstein) and economic psychology (à la Kahneman) , that is, the overcoming of affective and cognitive biases). Furthermore, the nanny state mistrusts its people to make the right decisions depriving them of their right of decision, and thus violating the liberal ideals of personal autonomy and sovereignty. Paternalism in all its facets -from Thaler, Sunstein and Kahneman up to Layard -and with all its (slightly) illiberal and heteronomous tendencies is therefore inconsistent with the Kantian and ordoliberal idea of man (Eucken 1948, pp. 73 ff.; 1949, p. 27; 1952 /2004 Böhm 1950, p. XXXV; 1966 / 1980 10 , which is primarily based on citizen sovereignty, emancipatory empowerment and human dignity.
From a Kantian-Euckenian perspective, paternalism should be dismissed due to its interference with individual liberty and infringement of private autonomy. That is, the paternalistic state interferes into the private sphere of individuals for their alleged own good, yet often against their own will. According to Kant and Eucken, restrictions, limitations, prohibitions and interferences with a person's autonomy, liberty and individuality are only legitimate if the exercise of one's freedom rights harms and restricts the freedom of others -yet the burden of proof is on the paternalist, not on the liberal.
11
Denying individuals the right to make their own decisions (which is particularly true for Layard's hard paternalism and its far-reaching policy recommendations) implies treating them as simply as means and not as an end in themselves as the Categorical Imperative demands. The rational agency or personhood has always to be respected, so the Kantian (and Euckenian) line of argument (Kant 1781 (Kant /2011 (Kant , 1785 (Kant /2013 (Kant , 1797 (Kant /2013 .
In short, the soft and hard paternalistic (welfare) state appears to be irreconcilable with the Kantian and Euckenian 'values of enlightenment' such as civil liberties, inalienable human rights and citizen sovereignty. The 'enlightenment view of man' in particular assumes an autonomous, mature (in the sense of self-determination and selflegislation), rational and socially responsible citizen (as citoyen) within a democratically legitimate socio-political order. According to (Kantian and Euckenian) 'normative individualism' (Kirchgässner 2012 12 ), people are better informed about their own interests than others and know better than the state (and the respective choice architects) what is good for them. This implies that whenever possible, values should not be imposed upon individuals and actions should not be prescribed by an external authority like the state (and its bureaucrats and expert-advisors).
This Kantian-Euckenian idea of citizen autonomy and (consumer) sovereignty got picked up by contemporary constitutional economists. Brennan and Buchanan (1985, p. 25) The fundamental question is where does the authority to use coercion to protect people from harming themselves and others come from? The coercive power of the state thus requires a solid justification and legitimation -one that is often lacking in the various soft and hard paternalism concepts. 12 See also Kirchgässner (2012) for more information on the relationship between soft paternalism, merit goods and normative individualism as well as the possibility to legitimize soft paternalism with the help of contractual and constitutional political agreements as well as collective self-commitments.
individuals as ultimate sources of value and valuation]. The critical normative presupposition on which the whole contractarian construction stands or falls is the location of value exclusively in the individual human being." All other positions that derive value from external and non-individualistic sources, such as soft and hard paternalistic (and elitist-expertocratic) policies, are to be regarded as anti-constitutionalist and anticontractarian, that is, illiberal, authoritarian and anti-individualistic (Buchanan 1991 (Buchanan / 1999 ).
And Vanberg (2005) , one of the most influential German constitutional economists, demands an (ordoliberal) 'private law society' à la Franz Böhm (1966 Böhm ( /1980 as the constitutionalization of private autonomy and citizen sovereignty. Vanberg claims that the agents themselves as private law subjects are the ultimate sovereigns, principals and judges in matters of (sub-)constitutional choice. That is, individual liberty as private autonomy is the foundational principle of a desirable social order (i.e., individualistic value norm) and the "evaluations of the individuals are the only source from which legitimacy in social matters can ultimately be derived" (Vanberg 2013, pp. 2 f.) . In other words, the legitimacy of politics is derived from the voluntary agreement of the affected individuals and their welfare represents the relevant standard against which politics is to be judged.
Epistemological Argument: Expertocracy and 'Pretense of Knowledge'
In the center of soft or libertarian paternalism are the choice architecture and choice designers or social engineers. The choice architects, in particular, are responsible for nudging people to do the 'right thing' or for influencing people in a certain way, a way that is presumably the best one for society as a whole.
14 But what does it mean referring to the 'right thing', the 'right' direction, and a choice architecture which supposedly makes people 'better off' 15 -either in terms of health and longevity (Thaler and Sunstein) or in terms of happiness (Layard) ? What are the desirable social objectives or 13 Please note that Buchanan himself does not ground his argument on informational advantages; instead, his argument is based on the assumption that individuals are the ultimate sources of value. 14 Paternalistic economics states that individuals themselves are not able to select the most efficient strategies and institutions due to their systematic cognitive biases. Thus, corrective regulation and government interference are required to correct the behavioral and cognitive biases of market actors. In other words, paternalistic policies and government interventions in private transactions are legitimate to correct affective and psychological biases so as to converge to market efficiency or social optimization -so the argument of (some) economists. As such, behavioral economics is (mis-)used as a justification for greater government regulation of markets (Saint-Paul 2011 target outcomes and how is it possible to channel behavior in the 'right' canals -once they are identified as such? How is it overall possible to acquire the appropriate knowledge prior to making these strategic decisions? Can we really assume the homogeneity of individual preferences and do such collective preferences exist at all? The various (new) paternalism concepts appear to underestimate and/or neglect the heterogeneity of individual preferences (and at the same time they overestimate the importance of collective preferences). In fact, the idea seems to prevail -at least among some behavioral and happiness economists -that a single and universally valid definition of a good life exists (Layard 2005 (Layard /2011 and that paternalistic policies are required to realize this specific way of life with the help of nudges and other paternalistic measures. 16 Furthermore, the various paternalism concepts seem to assume that the state as a 'benevolent dictator' knows what is best for its citizens. The state pretends to know the direction we should head off as well as the appropriate instruments and measures that should be taken. A superior and almost omniscient knowledge is required to make such decisions. These kinds of assumptions are (obviously) unrealistic and reflect the Hayekian problem of 'pretense of knowledge' (Hayek 1974 (Hayek /1996 : that is, they require (almost) perfectly informed paternalistic planners and social engineers -as ideal advisors and competent judges.
Additionally, this type of 'social engineering' (Popper 1945 (Popper /2011 ) rests on a certain form of expertocratic elitism which assumes that politico-economic advisors and specialists in the state bureaucracy know the best. This elitist-expertocratic understanding of knowledge is not only hard to achieve, but also self-contradictory. Kahneman's (2011, pp. 199 ff.) work, for example, has shown that especially 'experts' are famous for their unrealistic optimism and overconfidence -which, in turn, is often prone towards excessive risk-taking and other cognitive errors. As such, expert judgments are anything but reliable sources for decision-making. Academics as well as government officials are prone to the same behavioral or cognitive biases as other people.
Some commentators claim that these biases are even greater in the government sector than in the private market arena and that free and competitive markets have stronger and more reliable checks and balances than politics (Saint Paul 2011; Schnellenbach 2011 Schnellenbach , 2012 . They thus conclude that markets are better suited to solve behavioral and cognitive problems; a need for enhanced state interventions does not (necessarily) exist. Instead, the result of behavioral economics, economic psychology and happiness economics should be to have greater constitutional safeguards and limits of government power (i.e., 'rules rather than discretion'; Kydland and Prescott 1977; Simons 1936) .
Finally, the rise of experts and technocrats ('choice architects') -both being at the center of any (soft) paternalistic policy -incorporates a further risk: In an expertocracy 16 Here, the following questions come up: How is it possible that an outsider or a person just standing on the sidelines knows what is best for the particular individual in a particular situation or even for a nation as a whole? How can the state know a citizen's 'true' interests or preferences (Sugden and McQuillin 2012a) better than the citizen him-or herself? In case people cannot be trusted to make the right choices for themselves, how can we trust other people, namely scientists, politicians, government officials or bureaucrats, to make the right choices for the rest of society?
or technocracy, the levels of discretion and secrecy increase tremendously. This, in turn, also increases the risk of abuse of power: Politics relying on experts are vulnerable to the influence of vested interests and lobbying groups which might fund and/or influence the politico-economic advisors (see below). Even worse, it might go along with a lack of democratic legitimacy, since experts, specialists and technocrats are seldom directly elected by the people.
Constitutional Economics Argument: Ordnungspolitik vs. Prozesspolitik
One of the main arguments against paternalistic economic policies is the Ordnungspolitik or constitutional economics argument. The idea of distinguishing between Ordnungspolitik and Prozesspolitik dates back to the origins of German neoliberalism or ordoliberalism in the 1930s and 1940s (Eucken 1950 (Eucken /1965 (Eucken , 1952 (Eucken /2004 (Eucken , 1999 (Eucken , 2001 ); a similar argument can also be found in the works of Hayek, Buchanan and Vanberg who helped to refine the basic ordoliberal idea and applied it to modern-day economics.
According to the 'Freiburg Imperative', Ordnungspolitik (i.e., regulatory or ordering policy) is favored, which means that the state as a legislator and rule-maker -and not as a major player -is responsible for setting, preserving and maintaining the constitutional framework; the state should restrict itself to economic policies which institutionally frame in the sense of defining the general terms under which market transactions are carried out (Vanberg 2004, p. 4) . The state has to focus solely on the rules of the game instead of steering, influencing or intervening in market processes and the play itself. The aim of Ordnungspolitik is to implement a socio-economic competitive order which is capable -as a means to an end -of safeguarding individual liberty as well as human dignity (together with the help of the rule of law).
As stated by ordoliberalism, the ideal state is a strong (i.e., powerful and efficient) and independent constitutional state (Röpke 1942, pp. 86 and 286; 1944 /1949 1950, p. 142; Rüstow 1955, p. 63) , a state standing above special interest groups, and one that serves as a 'market police' (Röpke 1942, p. 86; Rüstow 1957, p. 98; 2001, p. 54) , as an ordering power and as a guardian of the competitive order (Eucken 1952 (Eucken /2004 Röpke 1944 Röpke /1949 ff.). The state should be able to fend off particular interests, keep to the principles of neutrality and impartiality and confine itself to Ordnungspolitik (Eucken 1952 (Eucken /2004 . The underlying liberal ideals are equality before the law, rule of law, freedom of privileges, and the principle of non-discrimination -quite similar to that of modern constitutional economics à la Buchanan, Congleton and Vanberg (Vanberg 2008 ).
Eucken's 'Principles of Economic Policy' demand not only the disempowerment of political and socio-economic lobbying or pressure groups; they also ask for a 'marketcompatible' Ordnungspolitik and the dismissal of a 'market-incompatible' and interventionist Prozesspolitik (Eucken 1952 (Eucken /2004 . The latter one is rejected for different reasons: Prozesspolitik as a form of 'privilege-granting policy' is based on isolated and ad hoc decisions; it enables arbitrary and selective interventions in the economic 'game of catallaxy' (Hayek 1973 (Hayek , 1976 (Hayek , 1979 ) -and what is most important -it is subject to the particularistic influence of special interest groups and their influence on the legislative process (this might also involve a critical discretionary leeway for political and legislative decision-making and a lack of democratic legitimacy, since most rent seeking groups represent only a tiny fraction of the population and are seldom democratically elected). This kind of interest groups-based policy reduces the overall wealth of a nation due to granting costly and exclusive privileges. Furthermore, it endangers and threatens the liberty of its citizens due to a high(er) level of state interventionism into the private sphere of individuals.
Following the ordoliberal distinction between Ordnungspolitik and Prozesspolitik, all previously discussed types of paternalism 17 tend to fall into the Prozesspolitik category: Both soft and hard paternalism rely more on discretion rather than rules. In addition, the importance of a rule-based economic policy at the macro-level seems to be disregarded and/or overlooked. To the contrary, the sphere of political influence -i.e., the number of fields of state interventions and the regulatory load -(would) increase substantially. According to the (soft and hard) paternalists, several hitherto unregulated fields shall ideally be subjected to new governmental regulation -think of the suggested paternalistic reform measures in the fields of investments, pension plans, insurance and healthcare (soft paternalism) respectively taxation, payment systems, geographical mobility, advertisement, education, parenting and mental illnesses (hard paternalism) as discussed in sections 2.3. and 3.3. Instead of focusing on a rule-based regulatory policy at the macro-level, paternalistic policies rely considerably more often on case-by-case (and prozess-political) interventionism. Due to this lack of a long-term stable and sustainable economic policy, the discretionary leeway for decision-making increases considerably and therefore opens up the doors for the influence of particularistic interest groups, e.g., in the form of so-called expert advisors and lobbyists pressuring decisionmakers. In such a situation, it is much harder to constitutionally restrict the power of rent seekers and to re-structure incentives for choice architects to pursue the public good.
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Excursus: Rules, Justice and Social Order
The Ordnungspolitik argument of German neoliberalism can also be reformulated in the following way: We might say that (soft and hard) paternalistic policies seem to favor end states or outcomes over processes and rules. As sections 2 and 3 have shown, most justifications for paternalistic interferences are consequentialist in nature, that is, they put forward the argument that (soft and hard) paternalism produces more good than harm and that it increases subjective well-being and societal welfare. The constitutional-17 It should be noted that all forms of paternalism contain the subsequent risks of (privilege-granting)
Prozesspolitik -albeit to a differing degree, in the sense that Layard's hard paternalism is much more exposed to the inherent risks of Prozesspolitik (and paternalism) than the other (softer) versions of paternalism. 18 Following Blumenthal-Barby (2013, p. 184), we can characterize the paternalistic Prozesspolitik as a 'choice architecture at an individual day-to-day level', while the non-paternalistic regulatory policy or Ordnungspolitik resembles more a 'choice architecture at a grand level' and with a long-term perspective.
ist-contractarian approach developed by Hayek, Buchanan and Vanberg, however, states the exact opposite: it is primarily process-and rule-oriented, not consequentialistteleological.
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In accordance with classical ordoliberalism, the constitutional politico-economic framework distinguishes between the order of rules (i.e., rules of the game) and the order of actions (i.e., patterns of actions and plays of the game within these rules). Furthermore, two levels of collective decision-making have to be distinguished: the constitutional level with its selection of rules and constitutional choice (i.e., choices of/over rules) and the sub-constitutional level with its selection of actions under those rules (i.e., choices within rules).
At the center of the contractarian-constitutionalist approach is the establishment of legal or constitutional constraints. That is, it aims at providing the grounds for a rulebased government and a contractarian state. According to Brennan and Buchanan (1985/2000) , governments need to be restrained by formal-institutional rules in order to incorporate long-term interests and to take the interests of future generations into account. Contemporary (paternalistic) politics, so their argument, are not only driven by short-term perspectives, but also by an ever-expanding intrusion into the lives of citizens. In this context, Brennan and Buchanan disqualify the (paternalist) state as a "benevolent despot" 20 (ibid, p. 48). They state that current politics equals a 'politics without rules' and that it contains a high discretionary leeway for legislative decision-making, thus increasing the power of rent seeking groups. What is needed, though, is a 'Politics by [Generality] Principle, Not Interest' (Buchanan and Congleton 1998 ). Constitutionalpolitical (self-)constraints are needed, that is, rules constraining governments and political actions. To restore monetary stability and fiscal discipline and to minimize rent seeking activities of special interest groups, the discretionary authority of politics needs to be restricted.
Justice considerations, seen from this perspective, are only applicable to rules and procedures, not to outcomes and end states. In accordance with Hayek's arguments presented in 'Law, Legislation and Liberty', Buchanan, Brennan and Vanberg favor procedural justice and justice among rules, that is, commutative justice based on abstract, impersonal and end-independent rules. Social or distributive justice is dismissed due to its outcome and end-state orientation (moreover, conceptions of distributive justice are more susceptible to the misuse of rent seeking groups). The problem is that it is almost impossible to reach an agreement on ends -such as what social justice contains -, while it is much easier to agree on means, that is, just and universally applicable procedures and rules (i.e., regulations which apply equally and indiscriminately to all agents in the respective jurisdiction). Only with privilege-free constitutional interests -as opposed to special or privileged action interests -can consensus principally be reached. The procedural consensus criterion -together with the concept of citizen sovereignty -functions as a legitimizing device: Legitimacy is derived from voluntary agreement on the constitutional level and among sovereign agents. People are more likely to agree because con-stitutional interests, such as equal and impartial treatment of persons (i.e., nondiscrimination), freedom of privileges as well as equality before the law and freedom under the law, help to realize mutual gains from voluntary cooperation. It is these constitutional interests that serve everyone's long-term interests and are thus consensual Tullock 1962/1999; Buchanan 1975 Buchanan /2000 Brennan and Buchanan 1985/2000; Vanberg 2005 Vanberg , 2008 Vanberg , 2013 Congleton 2013) .
Even though a constitution can be shown to be mutually beneficial to all affected, incentives remain for individuals and interest groups to seek for themselves the extra benefits of special privileges. Regelgeltungsinteressen (i.e., general interest in passing a bill or adopting a constitution) and Regelbefolgungsinteressen (i.e., interest in rule compliance) sometimes fall apart. Thus, an incentive for defection, free riding and opportunism and a constant threat of a potential erosion of the constitution by privilege and rent seeking exist. This prisoner's dilemma-like situation asks for effective institutional precautions in the form of constitutionalized rule commitments (Vanberg 2005 (Vanberg , 2008 (Vanberg , 2013 .
Hard and soft paternalistic policies now tend to undermine the constitutionalcontractual 'project' due to their end state and outcome orientation (Sunstein, for example, refers to and (partially) justifies 'end paternalism' (Sunstein 2013a)) as well as their (indirect) attempt to soften constitutional constraints. It has already been noted that these kinds of policies rely more on discretion rather than rules and that they promote privileged action instead of constitutional interests. This is the case, since the political areas of state interventions -including various redistributive measures -as well as the (discretionary) powers and scopes of influence of bureaucrats and expert-advisors are expanded, without implementing adequate political control mechanisms.
Political Economy Argument: Markets vs. State
Soft and hard paternalistic policies seem to assume that state solutions are -under certain conditions -better suited than market solutions. Based on the assumption that private decision-making is cognitively flawed, soft (and hard) paternalism favors expertocratic-technocratic decision-making and paternalistic state interventions. The paternalistic state solution, however, faces several serious drawbacks compared to market solutions, as has been shown by constitutional-political thinkers such as Hayek and Buchanan. These and other issues are not adequately taken into account by the various paternalistic concepts.
First, state solutions are rather static and often lack flexibility; they tend toward standardization and a 'one size fits all' policy 21 -which might be inappropriate to overcome behavioral and cognitive biases, the primary objective of soft paternalism. The problem is that the heterogeneity of individuals and individual preferences is often not taken into account by (soft) paternalistic planners. State solutions can also cause non-intended side effects, which in turn might entail a 'spiral of interventions' (Mises 1922 (Mises , 1927 .
Second, the various paternalistic concepts do not adequately take into account the phenomenon of state or government failure. The authors elaborate intensively on market failure -actually, this is one of the legitimizing reasons behind the different (soft) paternalism concepts -, but they almost completely neglect potential government failures. It seems as if their assumptions ask too much of politicians, state agencies and bureaucracies alike. Even well-meant regulations and state interventions aiming at making the world a better place might backfire both because of the bounded rationality of politicians, government officials and bureaucrats 22 and because of regulatory capture.
Third, Thaler, Sunstein, Kahneman and Layard seem to assume that government and state officials always pursue the common good, e.g., in the form of an increase in personal well-being and social welfare. But can we really take the neutrality and disinterestedness of choice architects for granted? Do neutral frames and choice designs exist at all? How can we rule out motivational problems, conflicts of interest and the malevolence of choice architects and social engineers? How can we minimize the (potential) risks of abuse of power and manipulation?
For instance, the self-interests of choice architects, that is, financial benefits or interests of special interest groups as employers, might conflict with the chooser's interests. There might be an incentive to 'shape' choices -i.e., manipulating the frame, e.g., by limiting or blocking some of the available choices -or to nudge people in a direction which benefits the choice architects (or their employers) rather than the users (Blumenthal-Barby 2013, pp. 185 ff.). In addition, if nudges might help to reach so-called 'socially desirable goals', they might also be employed to reach socially unwanted ones; e.g., social designers could use their power to exploit and benefit from people's ignorance or lack of knowledge or they simply make use of subliminal advertising. In short, bad nudges are as likely as good ones (Hausman and Welch 2010, p. 135) .
It seems as if the authors of the various (soft) paternalism approaches underestimate the power relationships inside the politico-economic sphere as well as the self-interested motives that might play a role in choice design. The central question is: How can we mitigate 'egotism', rent and privilege seeking as well as potential conflicts of interest in choice design? In case, (soft) paternalistic measures are applied, we need -at the minimum -adequate constitutional safeguards such as efficient monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms and a re-shifting of the incentive structure. The primary aim must be to avoid conflicts of interest as well as incompetency and poorly designed incentive architectures. Furthermore, the constitutional principles of publicity and transparency 23 -in combination with adequate disclosure requirements -should be followed by all means. That is, we have to ensure that choice architects as well as government officials pursue a political method that is publicly accountable and justifiable (cp. Eucken's constitutive principle of liability), and thus achieves public approval and acclaim. A comprehensible 22 I.e., problem of cognitive and affective biases and systematic errors affecting the choice architect's judgments and decision-making (Blumenthal-Barby 2013, pp. 183 ff.). 23 For more information on the transparency and publicity criteria (and requirements) as potential criteria of consent: see Schnellenbach (2014, chapter V) .
public disclosure of the applied methods, the underlying motives, including a disclosure of potential conflicts of interest, and the pursued goals is needed (which is not yet the case). Only then can the risks of abuse and manipulation be limited (Hausman and Welch 2010, p. 135) . Surprisingly, these and other precautionary constitutional measures have not yet received much attention in the soft (and hard) paternalistic research literature. So far, the article has just dealt with the particular disadvantages of state solutions; we now turn towards the (theoretical) advantages of markets. Here, Hayek's (and also Buchanan's) understanding of markets is of great help: Hayek views competitive markets as spontaneous, self-generating orders that allow for ongoing experiments and learning processes. Competition is regarded as an experimental 'discovery procedure' that makes use of the division or fragmentation of widely dispersed and decentralized knowledge. The price mechanism, in particular, functions as a medium of communicating knowledge; it conveys information in a coded form (Hayek 1968 (Hayek /2002 1973, pp. 117 and 125; Schnellenbach 2011 Schnellenbach , 2012 . 24 Moreover, Hayek believes that competitive markets -which stimulate constant trial and error learning processes 25 -enable a better, more accurate and faster feedback compared to public decision-making and state solutions.
In the political sphere, however, incentives to correct are believed to be rather weak and feedback mechanisms are believed to be rather poor and slow -at least compared to (ideal) ordoliberal competitive markets. One reason is that the state solution, and not the market solution, faces the Hayekian knowledge problem: the problem of how to utilize (and centralize) the factual knowledge that is widely dispersed among individuals without relying on markets as institutional arrangements or arenas for voluntary cooperation. (Soft) paternalistic policies assume quasi-omniscience and the well-informed choice architect (i.e., pretense of knowledge) (Hayek 1974 (Hayek /1996 . The problem is that information on individual preferences cannot be centralized by a paternalistic government 'planner'.
In addition, paternalistic 'planners' and choice designers are also susceptible to the same epistemological problems and deficiencies as 'ordinary people' (i.e., limits of reason due to limited mental capacities, human ignorance and various forms of uncertainties). That is, systematic affective and cognitive biases -coupled with informational constraints due to bounded rationality -might also affect the choice architect's judgments and decision-making. Both aspects together -the knowledge problem (respectively the lack of competition and adequate feedback mechanisms) and the problem of bounded rationality -(might) enhance the error-proneness of state agencies. That is, 24 According to Sugden (2008) , the main argument of behavioral economics is that incoherent, unstable and context-dependent preferences, irrational consumers and bounded rationality justify (soft) paternalism. Yet the existence of incoherent preferences does not touch upon the Hayekian or Buchanan' understanding of markets (see also Sugden and McQuillin 2012a, 2012b) . 25 There is a particular concern that soft paternalism and its choice architecture do not allow for these types of learning processes and the respective potential gains in knowledge: "Choosers typically learn by trying out different things and making mistakes, and since choice architecture nudges people directly to the best outcome, it does not seem to allow for this learning process" (Blumenthal-Barby 2013, p. 187).
public-political decision-makers or government officials and bureaucrats (might) be more susceptible of making errors than private decision-makers (Glaeser 2006) . In practice, the lack of (complete) information often impedes the design of efficiency-enhancing paternalistic economic policies: Paternalistic interventions actually aim to move the economy closer to Pareto efficiency; they especially aim at Pareto improvements among consumers -e.g., by steering people's choices in welfare-enhancing directions and away from welfare-decreasing biases. Yet this aim can hardly be reached due to informational constraints and bounded rationality of government officials and bureaucrats. In some cases, even the exact opposite of what behavioral economists want to achieve might occur, that is, socio-economic inefficiencies in the sense of a decrease in subjective well-being and social welfare. 26 Schnellenbach (2012, p. 272) therefore concludes: "… all the biases leading to inferior decision-making identified by the new paternalists will be much stronger than on the market place, simply because immediate feedback mechanisms are missing." According to him, cognitive biases in politics are more pronounced compared to those in the private or market sector. Even worse, already existing biases can even get enhanced due to a rather indirect and unspecific feedback mechanism -the multi-yearly electoral competition in a parliamentary democracy is only rudimentary compared to everyday economic competition (Schnellenbach and Schubert 2014) . Consequently, Schnellenbach and others favor entrepreneurship and market rewards instead of paternalistic state interventions, and suggest markets for self-regulation à la Coase as a potential solution: More ordoliberally enclosed and embedded markets -with the state as a regulatory power and consumer sovereignty as the economic complement to (political) citizen sovereignty -are needed to overcome affective and cognitive biases. Due to their superior knowledge transfer and exchange as well as their advanced feedback mechanisms, competitive markets are able to outperform paternalistic measures. 
Slippery Slope Argument: Soft vs. Hard Paternalism
There is no doubt that soft paternalism -favored by (some) economic psychologists (Kahneman) and behavioral economists (Thaler and Sunstein) -and hard paternalismderived from (Layard's) happiness economics -are different: While the former relies more on informal institutions 28 , such as 'soft law', politico-economic incentives and default rules (as being part of the overall choice architecture), and clearly rejects authoritarian coercion and repression, the latter is much more intrusive in the sense of interfering with personal liberty, infringing on private autonomy and/or circumventing the individual's will (cp. Layard's ideas about education, parenting and the use of medical drugs presented in section 3.3.). Yet the distinctions are subtle and a fluent or gradual transition from soft to hard paternalism exists. Layard, for example, is explicitly and positively referring to soft paternalism and considers it to be similar to his own approach (Layard 2005 (Layard /2011 . From his perspective, both theories are complementing each other; no fundamental differences are detectable. Sunstein (2013a Sunstein ( , pp. 1858 , on the other hand, speaks of a continuum of paternalistic interventions from soft to hard paternalism and admits that the line between 'means paternalism' and 'end paternalism' can be blurry. According to him, there is simply no sharp or categorical line of distinction between the two paternalism concepts. Moreover, hard or end paternalism is not ruled out completely by the proponents of soft or libertarian paternalism. In some cases, even hard or end paternalism should be applied since it might help to increase people's welfare (Sunstein 2013a (Sunstein , pp. 1867 .
The problem with soft paternalism is that it is difficult to control and monitor. Once paternalistic interferences start, they are hard to stop. Where are the (constitutional) limits of soft paternalism? What is the optimal amount of (soft) paternalism? Which paternalistic policies are legitimate, which ones are illegitimate? -, one might ask .29 Furthermore, soft paternalism might build support for hard paternalism: Hard paternalism might appear as an attractive option for politicians seeking (re-)election as well as lobbying groups seeking privileges. Paternalistic policies have redistributive effects and welfare implications; as such, they are more prone to the influence of special interest groups (Schnellenbach 2011 (Schnellenbach , 2012 .
For the stated reasons, soft paternalism might be the beginning of a 'road to serfdom' -to use Hayek's terminology (Hayek 1944 (Hayek /2007 : it is difficult to constrain and might in the end lead towards hard paternalism (i.e., slippery slope 30 ). To put it differently: once we allow the state to intervene in (more) private affairs -those which lie beyond the classical, ordoliberal state tasks -, we (might) open the gates for even more (correcting) state interventionism (i.e., spiral of interventions) and tread the path towards the Hayekian 'road to serfdom' (Hayek 1944 (Hayek /2007 drifting towards ((quasi-)despotic) arbitrariness und uncertainty. In the end, the paternalistic intrusion of government in private affairs might lead to extensive state control. and orders. One advantage of hard paternalism, so to speak, is exactly this increased visibility and transparency contributing to a higher reliability in expectations, while soft paternalism seems to be more subtle and intransparent in nature, which makes it more prone to abuse and manipulation. 29 That soft paternalism is hard to control for shows the wide scope of applications in the appendix of the 'Nudge' book as well as the various websites and 'nudge policy units' referring to the genuine nudge concept. 30 Grüne-Yanoff (2012, p. 644 ) even goes as far as to claim: "Yet, in the light of the argument presented here, any justification of [libertarian paternalism] policies must appeal to traditional paternalistic principles, as there is no categorical difference between "libertarian" and other forms of paternalism. Acknowledging that it is the same old wine, merely presented in a beguiling new cask, may actually make it more palatable than it currently is."
Although, Hayek's fears that we will (inevitably) end up in a centrally planned economy and that we are already on the road towards an encompassing, politico-economic authoritarianism and despotism seem nowadays far-fetched, we nevertheless have to debate the inherent consequences of paternalistic state interventions. For instance, is it practically possible to distinguish between situations that require a little nudge and situations that require a proper push or even a hit by a public authority? Is it feasible to distinguish between liberal interventions, interventions that go astray -and thus represent the beginning of the slippery slope 31 -and (slightly) authoritarian interventions? Furthermore, is it possible to (constitutionally) impede the process of increasing state interventionism? How can we prevent a potential overreaction -e.g., in the form of an arbitrary or 'despotic' abuse of power -and how can we prevent unintended developments? Useful insights in these regards can be gained by re-considering the constitutional economics approach put forward by the German neoliberals as well as by Hayek, Buchanan and Vanberg -focusing on the order of rules and legal-constitutional constraints.
V. Critical Evaluation
A world without any form of paternalism is neither imaginable nor desirable -to the contrary. Many paternalistic rules are already in place and (some of them) have proven to be successful in the sense that they are of great use for society as a whole -think of all the safety measures in the fields of health(care) and transportation. Consequently, the neoclassical-economic ideal of a paternalism-free society seems unrealistic.
Throughout the article, we therefore do not pursue a consequent anti-paternalism and we do not argue against all forms of paternalism -to the contrary. However, what is important from an (ordo-)liberal and constitutional economics perspective is that the de facto existing paternalism is constitutionally constrained and that it is regulated in a way that makes it (as much as) compatible with the concepts of a private law society (à la Böhm), citizen sovereignty (à la Vanberg) and normative individualism (à la Buchanan (and Hayek) ).
It should also be noted that we explicitly acknowledge the empirical insights of behavioral economics, economic psychology and happiness economics on which the soft paternalistic nudge approach is based. In particular, their critical evaluation of the Homo oeconomicus model is of great help. We regard these 'new economics' sub-disciplines as necessary supplements of the standard economics approach.
31 Saint-Paul (2011, pp. 78 ff.) summarizes the slippery slope argument as follows: Behavioral economics and economic happiness research start with awareness rising and educating people about their own cognitive biases; then, they aim at restricting choices for the people's own good (i.e., well-meant attempt to make the world a better place and to pursue happiness) and a higher taxation for addictive goods ('sin taxes'); next comes pricing 'pseudo-externalities' and taxing to correct the drive for status. Even worse is manipulating the context by reframing the choice problem so as to favor the socially preferred and desirable outcome. In the end, behavioral economics and happiness economics end up with manipulating beliefs and preferences by or through schooling, education and 'state propaganda': educational curricula are changed (for better or worse), people's access to information is restricted for their own good, and information is manipulated to improve social welfare.
Yet the main aim of the article is to raise the awareness and to sensitize (affected) people, politicians and researchers in terms of the inherent risks of the new forms of paternalism. Thus, we distinguish between the descriptive level and the normative level: At the descriptive level, the empirical studies of Camerer, Kahneman, Thaler and colleagues are of eminent importance when it comes to better understanding the cognitive and psychological foundations of economic decision-making as well as actual human behavioral conduct. Yet at the normative level -the level of politico-economic implications -(some of) the recommendations and conclusions of behavioral economics, economic psychology and happiness economics have to be received with caution. This is particularly true for Layard's policy suggestions concerning education, parenting, taxation, geographical mobility, advertisement, mental illnesses and happiness-enhancing psychiatric drugs.
32 Also, the potential risks related to the slippery slope and the spiral of interventions argument as well as the (enhanced) inherent risks of lobbying and rent seeking -due to inadequate constitutional safeguards, inefficient judicial control and monitoring, a lack of long-term orientation and stability, and a (latent) increase in ad hoc Prozesspolitik interventionism -should be critically examined. These systemic risks of paternalistic policies certainly differ from soft to hard paternalism; yet even soft paternalism faces (almost all of) the above-mentioned risks -albeit to a differing degree compared to hard paternalism.
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To illustrate (some of) the inherent risks of soft paternalism, let us now take a brief look at the two most prominent examples of application of the nudge approach, personal (company-related) pension plans and organ donation, and their inherent problems.
I. Private (company-related) pension systems developed and recommended by socalled Behavioral Insights Teams or Nudge Units 34 come with the disadvantage that they are -at least partially -accompanied by coercion (Grüne-Yanoff 2012) 35 , e.g., in the form of compulsory membership: Either the customer has no choice to leave the contract or ending the contract involves (high) transaction costs. This implies that in some cases nudges cannot be resisted or overcome that easily and 32 Cp. Sunstein 1991, pp. 11 ff.: In here, Sunstein favors controls on additive substances such as cigarettes and drugs and supports the (subsidizing of) public broadcasting of high quality programs. 33 It should be clear that the points of criticism focusing on Thaler and Sunstein (and Kahneman) show that even softer versions of paternalism contain serious drawbacks and inherent risks. These risks, however, are even more pronounced in Layard's happiness economics. Therefore, all mentioned points of criticism are much more relevant for Layard than for the other soft paternalistic concepts. 34 Nudge Units and Behavioral Insights Teams have already been established by US-President Barack Obama and British Prime Minister David Cameron. The German government under Angela Merkel also seeks to establish a behavioral economics 'advisory council' to explore new forms of 'effective governance'. 35 An adequate balancing strategy is required which allows for weighing up voluntariness (i.e., voluntary choices based on the freedom of coercion and the rationality assumption) and consent (i.e., respect a person's liberty, personal autonomy and sovereignty), on the one hand, and harm prevention, on the other hand. Our paper argues that a regulatory policy à la ordoliberalism and constitutional economics is better suited for such a balancing strategy than a paternalistic (and privilege-granting) Prozesspolitik.
cheaply as stated by Thaler and Sunstein. 36 Due to the fact that private (companyrelated) pension schemes are in most industrialized countries not directly related to safeguarding ones subsistence level, fiscal or tax incentives set by the state (on the regulatory policy level) seem to be a more promising idea -compared to compulsory membership and (soft) paternalistic coercion. II. When it comes to organ donation, the second prominent example of libertarian paternalism, the question comes up whether organ donation contains a small nudge or a big push? Especially, the 'opt-out' model and its automatic tissue and organ 'harvesting' after brain death has been diagnosed contains serious ethical issues. For instance, are organs considered collective property? How can we assure that the bodily integrity of a person, one's personal rights and liberties as well as one's power of disposition are not restricted and/or violated? And how can we make sure that the ethical ideals of citizen sovereignty, private autonomy, individual selfdetermination and self-legislation as well as self-responsibility are respected?
What is important for our current discussion is that there is a fundamental difference between urinal flies and food arrangements in cafeterias, on the one hand -two other prominent examples in Thaler's and Sunstein's work -, and pension plans and organ transplantation, on the other hand. Moving from one category of examples to the other one involves a qualitative leap; this leap requires a special argumentative justificationone that seems to be missing, up to now, in the soft paternalistic concepts.
In the context of soft versus hard paternalism, the tasks and limits of states (and markets) as well as the demarcation and relationship between markets and states need to be critically re-examined: In some (not all) instances, competitive market solutions seem to be more promising (Hausman and Welch 2010, p. 136) . In case that the political or state solution is more effective, it still needs to be framed by adequate constitutional constraints and the rule of law. Constitutional rules properly designed and implemented can help to channel self-interested human behavior in socially beneficial directions (i.e., rules serving common constitutional interests). The aim must be to contain and ('ordnungs-politically') enclose paternalistic measures (e.g., by the rule of law, the principles of transparency and publicity as well as via competitive market mechanisms (Hausman and Welch 2010, pp. 135 f.) ) and to keep process-political state interventions to a minimum.
Last but not least, we should also distinguish between market(-based) nudges or nudges in private organizations like corporations, clubs and associations and political or societal nudges, that is, nudges affecting society as a whole: Nudging in markets is (ide-ally) framed by competition and market-price mechanisms functioning as control devices. These (and other) institutional checks and balances are less marked -and sometimes even completely lacking -in the political arena. Thus, there is a need for implementing constitutional constraints in the political arena that enable a rule-bound behavior of institutions and individuals -including politicians, government officials, bureaucrats and lobbyists.
VI. Frey's Happiness Economics: An Alternative Paradigm?
37 So far, the article has just focused on the rather new economic sub-disciplines behavioral economics, economic psychology and happiness economics and their paternalistic policy conclusions. That it is feasible to derive alternative, non-paternalistic recommendations shows the happiness research of Frey and colleagues. Thus, the new economic sub-disciplines are not necessarily accompanied by a paternalistic style of politics. 'Traditional' ordoliberal-like policy recommendations can also be derived from the new normative economics disciplines.
Frey's et al. argument is essentially Ordnungspolitik-and not Prozesspolitik-based focusing on the rules of the game (and constitutional constraints) instead of intervening directly into the market transactions and the play itself. That is, instead of focusing on the micro and meso levels -as Thaler, Sunstein and Layard do -Frey and colleagues focus more on the ordoliberal macro level, the level of regulatory policy. Furthermore, Frey's et al. approach makes use of Böhm's, Hayek's, Buchanan's and Vanberg's concepts of justice of rules, citizen sovereignty and normative individualism. Hence, it allows avoiding (most of) the inherent risks related to the new paternalistic policies mentioned above.
Frey's et al. approach rests on participation, inclusion and Teilhabe in the form of direct federal democracy (Frey 2010; Frey and Stutzer 2010; Stutzer and Frey 2010) . It claims that subjective well-being depends to a large degree on personal, politicoeconomic freedom, rule of law, 'voice' and accountability. Frey and colleagues found that people are much happier where they have more rights to referendums and where direct-democratic and federal institutions are implemented. The extent to which individuals are given 'voice' is essential. People have to have the feeling that they are treated with dignity, a feeling of identity, inclusion, self-determination and self-legislation. Opportunities for citizens to participate are significant determinants of personal wellbeing. Living and acting under institutionalized processes that contribute to personal autonomy, self-governance and citizen sovereignty apparently increase subjective wellbeing. The quality of the politico-economic process is a key factor in individual's happiness.
In this regard, Frey et al. distinguish between procedural utility (i.e., utility derived from participating in socio-economic and political decision-making processes) and outcome utility (i.e., utility derived from the actual outcome of these decision-making processes) (Frey and Stutzer 2005) : Procedural utility is closely connected to the constitu-tional 'design' of institutions. Frey's et al. focus is thus on the ordoliberal macro level, the level of the political constitution (Frey and Stutzer 2000) .
In particular, two institutions affect subjective well-being significantly -federalism and direct democracy. Direct democracy gives people the opportunity to referenda, initiatives and plebiscites. It establishes constitutional rules and checks and balances which function as safeguards against the rent seeking activities of particularistic interest groups. The pre-referendum, Habermasian discourse process with its exchange of arguments stimulates discussions among citizens and between politicians and citizens. It raises the level of information, the problem awareness of citizens and contributes to preference formation. Moreover, it ideally enhances citizen's perception of selfdetermination and lessens alienation and apathy.
Frey's et al. empirical findings suggest that political decision-making is closer to citizens' preferences in direct-democratic governance regimes: individual's preferences are better observed in political jurisdictions 38 with more direct participation rights due to the fact that decision-making can be better monitored by citizens themselves. As a direct consequence, the actual outcomes are closer to popular preferences. Thus, direct federal democracy raises not only procedural utility -in the sense of procedural fairness and justice among rules -, but also (and as a side-product) outcome utility.
Furthermore, Frey's et al. empirical studies on Switzerland show that directdemocratic and federal institutions raise the legitimacy of political action as well as the degree of social capital, especially in the form of people's trust in governmental institutions: "The more extended the direct democratic rights are in a canton, the higher is tax morale, the lower are the tax burden and public deficits, the less citizens evade taxes, and the higher per-capita incomes are" (Frey 2010, p. 186) . Direct democracy systematically raises procedural (and outcome) utility and therefore increases subjective wellbeing. As a consequence, Frey et al. -in accordance with German neoliberalism and constitutional economics -plead for encompassing individual's political-democratic participation rights, a decentralization of political decision-making, federalism, subsidiarity and regional autonomy.
Taken together, Frey's et al. approach not only avoids the (main) inherent risks of a paternalistic state, it also stands (more) in the Kantian and ordoliberal-constitutionalist tradition taking the autonomy and (citizen) sovereignty of people, human dignity and the protection of (inalienable) human rights seriously. It thus shows that it is possible to combine the valuable (descriptive) elements of the new economics sub-disciplines (e.g., their critical reflection on the Homo oeconomicus idea of man), while at the same time not to incorporate the rather critical (normative) implications and policy recommendations, as described in section 5. Consequently, the framework developed by Frey et al. seems to be better suited for a modern version of Ordnungspolitik -one that takes the empirical findings of behavioral economics, economic psychology and happiness eco-nomics into account and tries to connect them with traditional constitutional economics elements.
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VII. Concluding Remarks
The article started with the hypothesis of a growing importance of paternalism within the theory of economic policy. This thesis was illustrated by referring to three different sub-disciplines within normative economics, namely behavioral economics, economic psychology and happiness economics, all gaining momentum within the field of economics and all referring -albeit to differing degrees -to the concept(s) of paternalism. 40 In the center of the article were the works of Kahneman (as a representative of economic psychology), Thaler and Sunstein (as representatives of behavioral economics) and Layard (as a representative of happiness economics). It became obvious that behavioral economics (à la Thaler and Sunstein) and economic psychology (à la Kahneman) favor libertarian or soft paternalism, while (Layard's) happiness economics legitimizes hard paternalism.
The article approached the different versions of soft or hard paternalism from a constitutional economics perspective. In doing so, five main points of criticism were distinguished throughout the paper: the idea of man argument; the Ordnungspolitik argument; the market vs. state argument; the epistemological argument; and the slippery slope argument. The article showed that all forms of (new) paternalism tend to violate the key ordoliberal and constitutional-political criteria consumer sovereignty and citizen sovereignty -albeit to differing degrees.
41
The way the article was arranged -starting with Kahneman, Thaler and Sunstein and then moving on to Layard and happiness economics -was not accidentally: Although the points of criticism mentioned in section 4 apply to all different types of soft and hard paternalism, the inherent risks increase steadily and alarmingly and reach their 'culmination point' in the work of Layard when he discusses the role of moral education as a means of a Nietzsche-like 'trans-valuation of values' and the use of medical (hap- 39 The work of Frey et al. also offers an alternative approach towards implementing paternalistic measures -in case good reasons for their implementation exist and precautionary constitutional checks and balances are already in place: For instance, nudges and other paternalistic instruments could be directly voted on in a federal and direct democracy -as long as they are in accord with the spirit of the (rule of law) constitution (this would increase the transparency and publicity of nudges; by seeking approval and obtaining the consent of the affected community, the direct-democratic decision-making processes would also guarantee that individual self-governance and citizen sovereignty are fully respected). Yet nudges and other paternalistic instruments should not be up for election when they violate fundamental human rights or when they substantially alter the constitution in an illiberal way. Recent examples of how referendums are able to restrict personal liberty include the 2009 Swiss vote to ban construction of minarets as well as the 2014 Swiss anti-immigration referendum. 40 Together with neuroeconomics -which bears some resemblances to the just mentioned disciplines (Glimcher et al. 2009 ) -these three respectively four disciplines are at the forefront of modern-day economics and are therefore of particular interest. 41 That is, even soft paternalism displays severe inherent risks that should be taken seriously when debating its political and economic implications.
piness-or cognitive-enhancing) drugs. Here, the risks of abuse and manipulationwhich go far beyond those risks associated with a nanny state or benevolent dictatorship -manifest themselves.
a more realistic idea of man -, the derived implications and recommended lessons for economic policy should be received with concern and thus be subjected to a critical constitutional politico-economic review. The article also shows that the new economic sub-disciplines are not necessarily accompanied by a paternalistic style of politics; traditional, constitutional-political recommendations can also be derived from the (new) 'normative economics': The happiness economics approach by Frey et al., for example, not only avoids the inherent risks of a paternalistic state, it also stands (more) in the Kantian and constitutional economics traditions taking the autonomy and (citizen) sovereignty of people, human dignity and (the protection of) human rights seriously. It thus seems to be better suited for a modern version of Ordnungspolitik.
